Public Control of Private Sectarian Institutions Receiving Public Funds by Rogers, Richard B.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 1 
1964 
Public Control of Private Sectarian Institutions Receiving Public 
Funds 
Richard B. Rogers 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law 
Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Legislation Commons, Religion Law Commons, and the 
Social Welfare Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard B. Rogers, Public Control of Private Sectarian Institutions Receiving Public Funds, 63 MICH. L. REV. 
142 (1964). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/6 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COMMENTS 
Public Control of Private Sectarian Institutions 
Receiving Public Funds 
The reluctance of certain important religious denominations to 
accept federal aid was once, along with the establishment clause of 
the United States Constitution,1 a serious restraint on the granting 
of such aid to private sectarian educational and welfare institutions.2 
It was feared that grants of federal aid would inevitably lead to 
federal controls interfering with, or prohibiting altogether, religious 
observances and functions in private institutions.8 Recently, how-
ever, fear of control has been largely outweighed by economic diffi-
culty, especially in the area of primary and secondary education,~ 
leading the Roman Catholic Church and certain Orthodox Jewish 
groups actively to campaign for inclusion in any plan for federal 
aid to public schools. 5 
Federal aid to private sectarian institutions is not novel in 
the American political tradition. Congress has responded to pres-
sure from those private institutions favoring increased federal aid 
with many programs that benefit both public and private educa-
tional and welfare institutions.6 Under the Hospital Survey and 
Construction Act of 1946, 7 private denominational hospitals receive 
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion •••• " U.S. 
CoNsr. amend. I. For a thorough treatment of the establishment clause as an obstacle 
to federal aid, see generally DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 165-88 
(1963); KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 80-96 (1962); LANOUE, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR 
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS? 5-44 (1963); PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 424-94 (1953); 
Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953); Kauper, 
Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REv. I (1961); North, An 
Exposition and Analysis of Policy Arguments Against Federal Aid to Parochial Schools, 
9 CATHOLIC LAW. 43 (1963); Subcomm. on Education, Senate Comm. on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Constitutionality of Federal Aid to Education in its Various Aspects, 
S. Doc. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
2. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note I, at 483-84. 
3. As late as 1957, Cardinal Cushing warned fellow Catholics of the possibility of 
public control, stating: "We are not looking for any federal or government aid to 
build our schools. I would absolutely refuse the offer, for I cannot see how any 
government or state would build schools without expecting to control them in whole 
or in part." Hartford Times, May 30, 1957. 
4. For a summary of the present financial crisis in Catholic primary and secondary 
schools, see generally Hearings on Federal Aid to Schools Before a Subcommittee of 
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 335-61 (1961) 
(hereinafter cited as Hearings on Federal Aid). 
5. See, e.g., id. at 335, 974; PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note I, at 440-41. Indeed, it 
has been argued that to exclude parochial schools from any program of federal aid 
to public schools would be unlawful discrimination. See DRINAN, op. cit. supra note I, 
at 172. 
6. A complete list of federal programs under which institutions with religious 
affiliation receive grants or loans of federal funds may be found in Hearings on 
Federal Aid 949-54. 
7. 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29l(d) (1958). A total of 1,608 
church-affiliated hospitals had received $329,780,325 in federal aid by December 1961. 
DRINAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 37. 
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substantial federal grants for the construction of new facilities. The 
National School Lunch Act,8 also enacted in 1946, makes inexpen-
sive lunches ayailable to both public and private school children. The 
federal government is authorized to reimburse private and parochial 
schools for the education of congressional and Supreme Court 
pages.0 The tuition of Korean War veterans, attending either public 
or private schools and colleges, is subsidized by the federal govern-
ment.10 Under the National Defense Education Act of 1958,11 
private schools may obtain loans for the purchase of mathematics, 
science, or foreign language teaching aids, and eligible students in 
all colleges may borrow substantial sums from federal scholarship 
funds. Since 1950, private institutions of higher education have 
been able to obtain federal loans for the construction of new 
facilities,12 and the recent Higher Education Facilities Act of 196313 
makes outright grants available to them for construction purposes. 
The importance of these laws is two-fold. First, the fears that federal 
control would inevitably follow grants of federal aid have been 
greatly assuaged by the fact that only a minimal amount of control 
has been imposed under present programs, usually amounting 
merely to a duty to account for the use of funds.14 Second, the pass-
age of acts which benefit private church-affiliated institutions has 
demonstrated further that the "wall between church and state"15 
is not absolute,16 adding emphasis and encouragement to the efforts 
of those lobbying for further federal grants.17 Yet these same enact-
ments could provide a basis for future judicial and legislative cur-
tailment of religious discrimination, a privilege which private 
church-affiliated institutions now enjoy. This comment will examine 
the recent judicial and legislative developments which could result 
in federal controls limiting _religious practices in private sectarian 
educational and welfare institutions. 
I. JUDICIAL CONTROL 
The judicial threat to religious discrimination in private church-
affiliated institutions accepting public funds stems from an expan-
sion of the concept of "state action" under the fifth and fourteenth 
8. 60 Stat. 233 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1759 (1958). 
9. See 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 88a (1958). 
10. See 72 Stat. 1177 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 1620 (1958). 
11. 72 Stat. 1581-90 (1958), 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-45 (1958). 
12. See 64 Stat. 78 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1749a (1958). 
13. See 77 Stat. 366 (1963), 20 U.S.C.A. § 714 (Supp. 1964). 
14. See generally North, supra note 1, at 53-56. 
15. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
16. See Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in THE 
WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55 (1963); and Kauper, supra note 1, propounding 
interpretations of the establishment clause which would allow additional federal 
aid to sectarian institutions. 
17. See, e.g., Hearings on Federal Aid 415. 
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amendments. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights 
Cases,18 first asserted the theory that, while any private organization 
performing a beneficial public service might be encouraged by 
public money, the resulting publicly supported operation would be 
considered "state action" under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.19 This enlargement of the "state-action" concept to include 
private institutions receiving public funds was accepted by the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt 
Free Library,20 a case involving a library established in 1822 by 
private donation. By 1944, however, the city of Baltimore supplied 
ninety-nine per cent of the library's budget, held title to library 
property, and exercised a considerable degree of control over library 
expenditures. The court, stressing the volume of financial assistance 
provided by the municipal government and its control over the 
library's activities, held that the library's exclusion of a Negro from 
a library training course was "state action" of a discriminatory 
nature prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.21 Subsequently, 
in Norris v. Mayor & City Council,22 a Negro challenged his exclu-
sion from an art course at the Maryland Institute of Art, which had 
been organized as a private corporation but had accepted modest 
appropriations from the city and the state, had leased a building from 
the city, and had become subject to minimal control by both the 
city and state governments.23 The district court dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that the receipt of public funds must be 
accompanied by a greater degree of state control before "state 
action" was present. The court made it quite clear, however, that 
financial aid plus an unusual degree of state control might properly 
lead to the characterization of a "private" business or agency as a 
state operatioh.24 The question remaining unanswered by the Norris 
and Kerr cases is exactly how much control is required to satisfy 
the "state action" concept. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority,25 indicated that the required degree of control 
b_r a state is slight,26 but stated, "Only by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in pri-
18. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
19. Id. at 58-59. 
20. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). 
21. Id. at 219. 
22. 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948). 
23. The city had the right to examine the course of instruction annually, each 
councilman of the city and each state senator had the right to appoint one student 
annually to the school, and an annual report from the Institute to the governor 
was required.• 
24. See Norris v. Mayor & City Council, 78 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (D. Md. 1948). 
25. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
26. Id. at 723. 
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vate conduct be attributed its true significance ... .''27 In Burton, 
the Parking Authority had constructed a public parking facility 
in which space was rented to a private restaurant, which subse-
quently refused service to Negroes. The Supreme Court held that 
the Parking Authority. in its capacity as landlord, was exercising the 
requisite degree of financial assistance and control to include the 
operation of the restaurant within the scope of "state action." 
The "state action" concept received further expansive judicial 
interpretation in the recent case of Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hosp.28 This was an action brought by Negro physicians, 
dentists, and patients, on behalf of themselves and other Negro 
citizens, for declaratory relief against two private hospitals in North 
Carolina receiving federal aid under the Hospital Construction 
Act.211 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that private 
hospitals that participated in such a joint federal-state program 
were sufficiently involved with "state action" to be within the fifth 
and fourteenth amendment prohibitions against discrimination. 
Although the court admitted that receipt of public funds alone 
would not make the subsequent operation of the hospitals "state 
action,"BO the degree of governmental control imposed upon the 
recipient hospitals was so slight as to indicate that this additional re-
quirement had been almost completely eliminated. Federal involve-
ment in the operation of these hospitals was minimal; the Hospital 
Construction Act itself provides that, with several minor exceptions, 
nothing in the act should be construed as giving federal officers or 
employees any right of supervision or control over recipient hospi-
tals. 31 The Surgeon General of the United States is given the power 
to approve or disapprove individual state plans for the construction 
of new facilities and specific applications for grants.82 In the event 
of a sale of the hospital to an unqualified owner within twenty years 
after the completion of a hospital project, a proportionate share of 
the grant reverts to the federal government.BB In addition, the state 
plan must provide facilities without discrimination on the basis of 
race, creed, or color. although the plan may provide for separate 
27. Id. at 722. 
28. 325 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 958 (1964). 
29. The court examined that portion of the Hospital Construction Act tolerating 
"separate-but-equal" facilities, and held such portion unconstitutional under the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. See 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29le(f) (1958). 
30. The United States, as intervenor, conceded that receipt of a governmental sub-
sidy alone would not convert operation of the hospitals into "state action." Simkins v. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 32ll F.2d at 971. 
31. 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 291m (1958). 
32. See 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C, § 29lf(b) (1958); 60 Stat. 1041 
(1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29lh(f) (1958). 
33. 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291h(e) (1958). 
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but equal facilities.34 Once a grant has been made, however, no 
other continuing right of control or supervision exists under the 
statute.35 Similarly, the degree of involvement of the State of North 
Carolina was extremely slight. A statute, passed in 1945 pursuant to 
the requirements of the Hospital Construction Act, 86 authorizes the 
North Carolina Medical Care Commission to survey and determine 
the need for hospital facilities and the amount of state aid required 
by public and nonprofit private hospitals in financing their con-
struction projects.37 The statute also authorizes the Commission to 
receive such funds as might be appropriated for this purpose by the 
federal government or the State of North Carolina. In the opinion 
of the Attorney General of North Carolina, the Commission has no 
regulatory or supervisory powers over the operations of private non-
profit hospitals by virtue of this statute.88 In short, the degree of con-
trol required by the Simkins court to constitute "state action" by the 
federal government under the fifth amendment, and by North 
Carolina under the fourteenth amendment, is so slight as practically 
to subject all private institutions receiving federal or state aid to 
prohibitions against discrimination, since it would be unprecedented 
for federal and state governments not to retain that minimal degree 
of control necessary to assure that public funds are properly spent. 
The court's alternate theory of "state action" may prove as im-
portant as the demise of the state control requirement in its ulti-
mate impact on religious institutions that receive direct grants of 
federal aid through participation in a joint state-federal plan. The 
court found that the State of North Carolina, by electing to partici-
pate in the Hospital Construction Act, had assumed as a state func-
tion the obligation of planning for adequate hospital care. Citing 
the Supreme Court's decisions in the White Primary Cases,80 the 
court stated that "when a State function or responsibility is being 
exercised, it matters not for Fourteenth Amendment purposes that 
the ... [institution actually chosen] would otherwise be private; 
the equal protection guarantee applies."40 Under this public func-
34. 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29le(f) (1958). The Simkins court 
had no difficulty in finding the provision of "separate-but-equal" facilities unconstitu-
tional. See note 29 supra. 
35. There· are in addition, however, certain administrative controls, prescribed 
by the Surgeon General pursuant to the Hospital Construction Act, 60 Stat. 1041 
(1946), 42 U.S.C. § 291k (1958), providing in detail for the management of hospitals 
under such general headings as administration, clinical services, auxiliary services, 
nursing service, and food service. 
36. See 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291b (1958). 
37. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131-126.1-.30 (1964). 
38. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d at 972-73. 
39. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). Accord, Marsh v. Alabama, !126 U.S. 501 (1946); 
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). 
40. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d at 968. 
November 1964] Control of Sectarian Institutions 147 
tion theory of "state action," the degree of control exercised by the 
state government is irrelevant.41 Further, the public function theory 
of "state action" would seem equally as applicable to the federal 
government under the fifth amendment as to the states under the 
fourteenth amendment.42 This would assume significance if the 
federal government were to give funds directly to private institu-
tions without the use of states as disbursement agencies, as would 
probably be required under any massive program providing funds 
to parochial schools since a majority of states prohibit their officials 
from giving aid to sectarian institutions.43 Presumably, as in the 
case of states under the fourteenth amendment, it would make no 
difference that the agency chosen directly to perform a federal func-
tion would otherwise be private. 
The relevance of the public function theory of "state action" 
to church-related institutions is amplified by one of the major 
arguments advanced by those supporting increased federal aid to 
parochial schools in order to avoid the prohibitions of the "estab-
lishment clause." i::heir argument emphasizes that the public services 
provided by private church-related institutions, such as hospitals 
and schools, entitle them to public support, since the state would 
otherwise have to provide the same services at its own expense.44 
According to this interpretation of the "establishment clause," 
government is not required to act as though religion and its private 
institutions do not exist, but may recognize that they serve a useful 
public function which may be encouraged by the state, even through 
direct financial aid.45 Indeed, the Hospital Construction Act is often 
cited as an example of state and federal aid to private church-related 
institutions that perform a public function.46 If church-related insti-
tutions are to be given public funds because they perform a public 
function, it is difficult to see why their public function should be 
ignored by the courts in determining whether the requirement of 
41. For a more thorough treatment of the expansion of "state action" to include 
private institutions in which the author predicts the demise of the requirement! of 
substantial governmental control, see Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLuM. 
L. REv. 108!1, 1102-08 (1960). 
42. "But the concepts of equal protection [under the fourteenth amendment] and 
due process [under the fifth amendment], both stemming from our American ideal of 
fairness, are not mutually exclusive .••. In view of our decision that the Constitution 
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be 
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal 
Government, ••• " Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). 
43. For a summary of state laws prohibiting officials from distributing aid to 
private sectarian institutions, see Hearings on H.R.. 6774, H.R. 4253, H.R. 7378 Before 
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 240-54 (1961). 
44. See Drinan, supra note 16, at 55; Kauper, supra note 1. 
45. See Kauper, supra note 1, at lll. 
46, See, e.g., Hearings on Federal Aid !140. 
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"state action" has been met under the fifth or fourteenth amend-
ment. 
The importance of fifth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions 
against discrimination, racial or religious, to church-affiliated insti-
tutions receiving federal funds would, of course, vary with the 
amount of religious discrimination which church groups deemed 
necessary to uphold their respective religious beliefs. In the case of 
church-related hospitals receiving aid under the Hospital Construc-
tion Act-the most direct application of the concept of "state action" 
as developed in Simkins-examples of religious discrimination are 
rare. Denominational hospitals that receive public funds usually 
admit both patients and staff without regard to religious belief.47 
However, an example of discrimination on religious grounds was 
provided by St. Francis Hospital, a Roman Catholic institution in 
New York, which in 1952 required seven visiting physicians to 
sever their connections with the Planned Parenthood League or be 
barred from entry.48 The hospital's action was defended on the 
ground that "the courts have always upheld the rights of private 
institutions to choose their own staffs .... "49 The Simkins case makes 
it clear, however, that such religious discrimination would no longer 
be private action, outside the reach of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments, but rather would be prohibited "state action." Simi-
larly, a patient whose religious beliefs would permit a therapeutic 
abortion would be barred from such treatment at many Catholic 
hospitals solely on religious grounds.110 Even the presence of religious 
symbols in hospital rooms might be considered as having a dis-
criminatory effect on admissions. When the presence of such symbols 
in hospitals receiving federal-state aid was challenged as a violation 
of the "establishment clause," a court dismissed the argument as 
de minimis non curat lex.111 Nevertheless, for purposes of the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments, it could be argued that the presence of 
Christian religious symbols, for example, would not be de minimis 
to an Orthodox Jew seeking admission, since merely remaining in a 
room so adorned would be sinful to him. 
The National Defense Education Act, which contains provisions 
for aid to both secondary and higher levels of private nonprofit edu-
cation, may prove the vehicle by which the Simkins analysis of 
"state action" is made applicable to the field of education, where 
exclusion of students and faculty on religious grounds is often 
considered desirable in order to instill youth with the principles of 
47. See BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 159 (2d ed. 1958). 
48. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 1, col. 6. 
49. See America, Feb. 16, 1952, p. 5. 
50. DRINAN, op. dt. supra note 1, at 178. 
51. Craig v. Mercy Hosp., 209 Miss. 427, 45 So. 2d 809 (1950). 
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a particular faith.52 This act provides substantial loan funds for the 
purchase of science, mathematics, and foreign language teaching 
aids by private nonprofit secondary schools.58 With the receipt of 
public funds, these private schools are subject to at least the degree 
of governmental control held sufficient in Simkins to constitute 
"state action." Comparable to the Hospital Construction Act, the 
NDEA requires each participating state to submit a detailed plan 
to the Commissioner of Education for appropriations to public 
schools,5~ and the Commissioner has the power to disapprove state 
plans as well as specific applications by private institutions for 
loans.55 Even if the required degree of state involvement under the 
fourteenth amendment is found to be absent, direct loans from the 
Commissioner to private institutions may be subject to enough 
supervision and control to satisfy the requirement of federal in-
volvement under the fifth amendment. Private, nonprofit schools 
seeking loans from the Commissioner for equipment must submit 
applications containing such information as the Commissioner 
deems necessary, and all loans are subject to those certain conditions 
required to protect the financial interest of the United States.56 
Loans to students made through private institutions of higher 
learning are subject to conditions prescribed by the Commissioner, 
and the recipient institution itself must abide by eight rather inc<;m-
sequential conditions.57 Although the NDEA does contain an express 
repudiation of congressional intent to control the operations, curric-
ulum, or personnel of recipient schools, it must be remembered 
that a similar provision in the Hospital Construction Act did not 
prevent the Simkins court from finding the requisite degree of 
federal involvement.58 
The difficulty in applying the Simkins analysis of "state action" 
to private educational institutions receiving aid under the NDEA 
is that loans to schools for the purchase of equipment and to stu-
dents do not demonstrate the same degree of financial involvement 
52. Information on the extent of discrimination in parochial schools, on religious 
grounds or otherwise, is scant. However, a recent doctoral dissertation on admissions 
policies of Catholic high schools in Chicago found evidence of religious, racial, ethnic, 
economic, and family discrimination. See Pitruzello, Admissions Policies of Selected 
Catholic Secondary Schools and the Characteristics of the Students and Parents (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962). 
53. 72 Stat. 1590 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 445 (1958). 
54. Compare 72 Stat. 1589 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 443(a) (1958), with 60 Stat. 1041 
(1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291£ (1958). 
55. Compare 72 Stat. 1589 (1958), 20 U.S.C. 443(b) (1958), with 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29lf(b) (1958) and 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 29lh(f) (1958). 
56. 72 Stat. 1590 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 445 (1958). 
57. 72 Stat. 1584 (1958), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 425 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
58. Compare 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291m (1958), with 72 
Stat. 1582 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 402 (1958). 
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as exists under the Hospital Construction Act, which provides out-
right grants for the construction of new facilities. Recent attempts, 
however, to expand aid to private sectarian education under the 
NDEA would partially supply the direct financial involvement in 
the construction of new facilities. For example, in 1961 the House 
Education and Labor Committee reported out a bill which con-
tained a provision for 375 million dollars in long-term, low interest 
loans to be made available to private secondary schools for the 
construction of classrooms.rm Although the bill failed to pass the 
House, future passage of a similar bill would be analogous to con-
struction grants provided by the Hospital Construction Act, under 
which "state action" was found in Simkins. 
Moreover, even if the courts were to find a valid distinction be-
tween loans and grants, this distinction would not be helpful to 
private institutions of higher education that received grants of aid 
under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.60 This act is 
not only similar to the Hospital Construction Act in its provision 
for construction grants, but also conditions the receipt of federal 
funds on the presence of a state plan strikingly similar to that required 
under the Hospital Construction Act.61 In addition, the Commis-
sioner of Education is given the same degree of supervision over 
disbursement of funds as is reserved to the Surgeon General in the 
Hospital Construction Act.62 
Assuming that the degree of federal or state involvement re-
quired to constitute "state action" under the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments would be found by the courts to exist under the 
NDEA, the Higher Education Facilities Act, or some future act, 
religious discrimination now practiced by private sectarian schools 
in admissions, employment, and structuring of the curricula would 
almost certainly be limited.63 Catholic schools in 1961 employed a 
total of 62,433 lay teachers at all levels of education.64 A competent 
lay teacher would certainly be entitled to practice his profession in 
59. See H.R. 7904, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961). 
60. 77 Stat. 366 (1963), 20 U.S.C.A. § 714 (Supp. 1964). 
61. Compare 77 Stat. 367 (1963), 20 U.S.C.A. § 715 (Supp. 1964), with 60 Stat. 1041 
(1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291b (1958). 
62. Compare 77 Stat. 369 (1963), 20 U.S.C.A. § 718 (Supp. 1964), with 60 Stat. 1041 
(1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29lh(a) (1958). 
63. A form of discrimination more subtle than outright exclusion of students on 
religious grounds is the imposition of obnoxious conditions of admission. Many 
Protestant and Catholic parochial schools, for example, require students of different 
faiths to attend denominational services as a condition of admission. LANOUE, Punuc 
FUNDS FOR PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS? 29-30 (1963). Even the structuring of curricula, some-
times slanted to favor one particular religion, might operate to discriminate against 
both students and faculty of different faiths. Some of the more extreme examples of 
slanted curricula in parochial education are collected in LaNoue, Religious Schools 
and Secular Subjects, 32 HA&v. EDUC. REv. 255 (1962). 
64. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 183 (1963). 
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buildings constructed by public funds, or with teaching aids pro-
vided by public funds, without regard to religious affiliation. Simi-
larly, students should be able to gain admittance, without regard 
to religious affiliation, to private religious schools whose buildings 
and equipment are financed by public funds. In summary, the 
right of selectivity belongs only to the private school, which may 
discriminate in hiring and admissions practices upon any basis, 
including religious belief. Accepting government funds under any 
plan which would give the government some nominal degree of 
control, however, might turn the private character of sectarian edu-
cational operations into "state action," subject to the dictates of 
Brown v. Board of Educ.65 prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, or creed. 
II. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 
Apart from the possible controls imposed by the judiciary under 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments upon publicly financed schools 
and hospitals, there is a less immediate danger of control by the exec-
utive and legislative branches of the government. The problem was 
summarized by Mr. Justice Jackson in Everson v. Board of Educ.,66 
when he stated: "[W] e cannot have it both ways. Religious teaching 
cannot be a private affair when the state seeks to impose regula-
tions which infringe on it indirectly, and a public affair when it 
comes to taxing citizens of one faith to aid another, or those of no 
faith at all .... If the state may aid these religious schools, it may 
therefore regulate them. . . . Indeed this Court has declared that 
'It is hardly a lack of due process for the government to regulate 
that which it subsidizes ... .' "67 
Although Congress may have the power to impose obnoxious 
controls, it has shown no propensity to do so under a great many 
enactments giving aid to public and private education. The Hospi-
tal Construction Act, the Morrill Act,68 the National Defense Edu-
cation Act, the Higher Education Facilities Act, and the School 
Lunch Act have endowed private institutions, denominational and 
otherwise, with large amounts of federal aid unaccompanied by 
extensive governmental interference with the administrative or 
religious policies of the recipient institutions. Statutory control has 
usually amounted to little more than a required accounting to in-
sure that funds are spent for the proper purposes.69 While even this 
65. !147 U.S. 483 (1954). 
66. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
67. Id. at 27-28 Gackson, J., dissenting). 
68. 12 Stat. 503 (1862), 7 U.S.C. § 301 (1958), and 26 Stat. 419 (1890), 7 U.S.C. § 
321 (1958). 
69. See notes 31-35, 54-57, and 61-62 supra and accompanying text. The Morrill Act 
authorizes grants upon the assent by the participating states to several rather minor 
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slight degree of control might be enough to subject private recipi-
ents to prohibitions against discrimination under the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments,70 the controls themselves are neither of-
fensive, nor novel. Most colleges and universities already account 
to governmental agencies for funds received under a myriad of 
federal grants for research. The government may demand accredi-
tation by schools before making future loans or grants, as is required 
by the National Defense Education Act and the School Lunch Act,71 
but most private schools would seek accreditation in any event to 
assure the acceptance of their graduates in colleges and universities. 
In spite of the restraint exercised by the government under 
present programs aiding denominational institutions, conditions 
forbidding racial or religious discrimination have been attached to 
a few federal grants. Church-related groups that borrow money for 
housing construction from the Federal Housing and Home Finance 
Agency are forbidden by administrative order to discriminate by 
religion in admissions or to enforce sectarian rules upon residents.72 
This policy was recently buttressed by an executive order barring 
racial and religious discrimination in federally owned or financed 
housing.73 It would appear that the order will apply to colleges that 
receive federal funds for dormitory construction. Another example 
of governmental control that goes much further in curtailing re-
ligious practices in federally financed education is in an agreement 
between the United States and Columbia under the Alliance for 
Progress Program. 74 Columbia, whose educational system has long 
conditions, chief of which is the requirement of an annual report on the progress of 
each college. 12 Stat. 504 (1862), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 305 (1958). In addition, racial 
discrimination by colleges is restricted by 26 Stat. 417 (1890), 7 U.S.C. § 323 (1958), 
The School Lunch Act requires participating schools to keep such accounts and 
records as are necessary to determine if the provisions of the act are being complied 
with, but expressly prohibits the establishment of any administrative requirement with 
respect to teaching personnel, curriculum, instructions, methods of instruction, and 
materials of instruction in any school. See 60 Stat. 233 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 
l 760 (1958). 
70. See notes 30, 37-38 supra and accompanying text. 
71. See 72 Stat. 1582 (1958), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 403 (Supp. IV, 1963); 60 Stat. 
233 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1759 (1958). 
72. See LANouE, op. cit. supra note 63, at 40. 
73. "I hereby direct all departments and agencies in the executive branch of the 
Federal Government • • . to take all action necessary and appropriate to prevent dis· 
crimination because of race, color, creed, or national origin-
(a) in the sale, leasing, rental, or other disposition of residential property , ••• or 
in the use or occupancy thereof, if such property (is) • • • (i) provided in whole or 
in part with the aid of loans, advances, grants, or contributions hereafter agreed to 
be made by the Federal Government. • • ." Exec. Order No. 11063, Zl Fed. Reg. 
11,527 (1962). 
74. The United States in 1961 granted, on a government-to-government basis, 
$3,770,000 to the Colombian Government, of which approximately $2,435,000 was for 
public primary school construction. These funds have helped to finance the construction 
of about four thousand classrooms. United States Dep't of State, Agency for Inter-
national Development, United States Aid to Education in Colombia, July 24, 1964. 
November 1964] Control of Sectarian Institutions 153 
been supervised by the Catholic Church, has given assurances that 
in schools financed by United States aid there will be no discriminaJ 
tion in admissions on religious grounds; non-Catholic students will 
not be required to attend Catholic religious functions; all textbooks 
will be selected by public officials; and no religious qualification will 
be imposed on teachers.75 Although it is doubtful that such condi-
tions would be attached to massive federal aid to parochial schools 
in the United States, the due process clause would afford scant pro-
tection for institutions accepting substantial federal assistance were 
such conditions to be applied.76 
III. METHODS OF AVOIDING CONTROL 
Once the problem of public control has been recognized, it 
might still be possible for private church-related institutions to 
receive substantial grants of federal aid without substantial federal 
control. First, it is not at all certain that the present Supreme 
Court will go as far as the court did in the Simkins case in finding 
"state action" under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.77 Since 
the Supreme Court indicated in Burton that whether the required 
degree of state or federal involvement exists depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case, 78 a method of avoiding judicial 
control might be to diminish those factors the courts consider rele-
vant in finding "state action." One such factor is the amount of 
federal assistance received by an institution.79 The present forms 
of assistance to sectarian education also help diminish the degree of 
federal financial involvement. There is less financial involvement 
with loans than outright grants, as is also true with "fringe benefits" 
such as free milk, lunches, transportation, textbooks, and medical 
services. Moreover, the degree of involvement sufficient for "state 
action" purposes when racial discrimination is present might not 
satisfy a court in cases of morally less offensive religious discrim;i.-
nation in a separate system of institutions established solely for 
religious reasons and with a long history of private financing and 
control.80 
75. These assurances are contained in an exchange of letters between former Am-
bassador Fulton Freeman and former Colombian Minister of Education Dr. Jaime 
Pasoda, dated January 17, 1962 and March 30, 1962, respectively, and later confirmed 
in an exchange of letters between Mr. Henry Dearborn, Charge d'Affairs, a.i., of the 
American Embassy and the Colombian Minister of Education, Dr. Pedro Gomez Valder-
rama, dated October 2, 1962 and November 5, 1962, respectively. 
76. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. 
77. The Supreme Court declined review of the Simkins case. 376 U.S. 938 (1964). 
78. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. 
79. The Simkins case expressly stated that "massive use of public funds .•• " was 
a key factor in finding "state action." See 323 F.2d 959, 967. 
80. It should be noted, however, that a long history of private financing and control 
did not avail the two hospitals whose racial policies were attacked in the Simkins case. 
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Second, some of the plans suggested to circumvent the "establish-
ment clause" are also useful in avoiding the necessary degree of 
government involvement for "state action" purposes. The best 
plan for avoiding "state action" is patterned after the Korean War 
Orphans Assistance Act,81 which provided that the federal government 
appropriate a certain amount of money for each schoolchild, the 
parents being given a certificate to be used as tuition in schools of 
their choice, whether public or private.82 Under this plan, the 
individual parents would be the recipients of the financial grant, and 
the institution chosen by them would be entirely free of public con-
trol. The difficulty with such a plan is that several states have been 
using a similar scheme specifically designed to avoid the Supreme 
Court's holding in Brown v. Board of Educ. With regard to racial 
discrimination, the Supreme Court's recent holding in Griffin v. 
County School Board83 indicates that a scheme whereby public 
schools are closed and tuition grants given by the state to children 
attending private segregated schools is "state action" in violation of 
the fourteenth amendment. While the general intent to continue 
racial segregation as a state policy may have been decisive in Grif-
fin, 84 religious discrimination in private institutions financed by a 
similar tuition plan might not be distinguished. 
Many sectarian colleges and universities practice no discrimina-
tion toward students or faculty members of different religious be-
liefs. 85 These institutions, by accepting federal aid, stand to lose only 
the unexercised right of a private institution to engage in such 
discriminatory practices. However, the larger sectarian institutions 
of higher learning, which are generally the most free of religious 
discrimination, are also the institutions which least need federal 
money to survive. As to primary and secondary education, where 
religious discrimination is considered a desirable means of indoctri-
nating children in an atmosphere free of divergent religious beliefs, 
the financial need is greatest. It is here that the decision whether to 
accept public assistance, in view of possible legislative and judicial 
controls, must be made. 
Richard B. Rogers 
81. 72 Stat. II97 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958). 
82. See Hearings on Federal Aid 362-63. 
83. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
84. See id. at 227. 
85. E.g., "Students not of the Catholic faith are excused from attending classes in 
religion and from chapel exercises .•.. " Georgetown Univ. Catalog 1961-62, p. 7. 
